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1 Introduction14
For the longest time, philosophers of science avoided making reference to the notion15
of understanding in their accounts of explanation. Although Hempel, Salmon, and16
other philosophers who wrote about the subject in the 20th century recognized that17
understanding is one of the main goals of science, at the same time they feared that18
any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved would compromise19
the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argued, and20
∗Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science
Association in Vancouver, at the XVI Jornadas de Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia in Córdoba
(Argentina), and at the III Conference of the Latin American Association for Analytic Philosophy in Buenos
Aires. I am grateful to the audiences in these venues for their useful comments and questions.
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although a subject worthy of psychological investigation, pragmatics should be kept at21
a safe distance from the universal, epistemological features of explanation. Although22
this attitude towards the notion of understanding has changed in the last decade1, there23
are still many misgivings about using pragmatic notions in the analysis of one of the24
central concepts in the philosophy of science2.25
My main purpose of this paper is to defend the idea that there is a sense in which it26
is meaningful and useful to talk about understanding in an objective sense3, and that to27
characterize this notion it is necessary to formulate an account of scientific explanation28
that makes reference to the doxastic states and epistemic goals of the participants in a29
cognitive enterprise. It is important to clarify at the outset that my goal is not to offer30
a general analysis of the notion of understanding, and that my approach is restricted31
to the understanding of singular facts in well-defined scientific contexts.32
The essay is divided as follows. In the next section I introduce three theses about33
scientific explanation that will serve as the basis for the rest of the discussion. The34
first thesis, which is defended in sections 3 and 4, states that determining the potential35
explanations of a fact is essentially a non-pragmatic matter. This thesis is meant to36
allay the fears of those who see the introduction of pragmatic factors as the beginning37
of the road towards an unbounded relativism. Since the objective basis of explanation38
will be probabilistic, at the beginning of the paper I include a detailed discussion39
about the way in which probability will be used in my account of explanation. The40
second thesis, which is presented in section 5, states that it is possible to determine41
the epistemic value of most potential explanations of a fact, and that such value can42
be established in a non-arbitrary way despite being the result of the evaluation of43
individual researchers. Finally, towards the end of the essay I explain the third thesis,44
which establishes the criteria for the acceptance of an explanation in the corpus of45
beliefs of those researchers involved. These criteria are based on their joint assessment46
of the credibility and epistemic value of potential explanations.47
2 Three Theses about Explanation48
It has often been said that explanation is an interest-relative notion. Different inquir-49
ing agents impose different demands on the information they regard as explanatorily50
valuable. The interest-relativity of explanation has been accounted for in several ways:51
some authors have proposed a contrastive analysis of the explanandum (van Fraassen,52
1See, for example, de Regt (2009), de Regt, Leonelli & Eigner (2009), Fey (2014), Grimm (2008),
Khalifa (2012), Kvanvig (2009), and Strevens (2008, 2013).
2See, for example, Trout (2002, 2007) and Craver (2013) for more recent defenses of a purely ontic
approach to explanation.
3Objective understanding in this sense will turn out to be the opposite of what de Regt (2009, p. 585)
calls “the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding,” which he attributes to
Hempel and Trout.
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1980; Lipton, 2004) or a detailed description of the illocutionary context of an ex-53
planatory speech act (Achinstein, 1983). In my view, the interest-relativity of expla-54
nation has a much deeper origin. It derives from the interest-relativity of inquiry in55
general. Different agents use information for different purposes, and their acceptance56
of new information is directed by their cognitive and practical interests and goals. Far57
from being a superficial characteristic of inquiry, I believe that this is a fundamental58
trait of the acquisition of knowledge in general. The cost and effort that goes into59
obtaining new information makes the beliefs4 that an inquiring agent has accepted a60
valuable asset that must be treated with care. Gratuitous losses must be prevented61
and the agent’s acceptance of new information always involves the risk of bringing62
error into his system of beliefs. The risk must always be compensated by an epistemic63
incentive that outweighs the cost.64
One of the biggest epistemic incentives of all is to obtain understanding of a fact.565
But if understanding a given fact fulfills no purpose in the eyes of an inquiring agent,66
he will be more reluctant to incur the risks involved in accepting an explanation of it.67
On the other hand, if understanding a fact fulfills the cognitive interests and goals of68
the agent, but the information explains too much, it might be too good to be true. The69
acceptance of an explanation thus requires a delicate balance between two conflicting70
cognitive goals: the acquisition of valuable explanatory information and the avoidance71
of error.72
The account of explanation that I present in this paper takes into account the dif-73
ference between information and informational value, between the informational con-74
tent of an explanation and the epistemic value of that content. When an agent seeks75
to expand his beliefs, his interest is restricted to information that promotes his cog-76
nitive goals or that is relevant to the problems he is trying to solve. In Catherine77
Elgin’s words, “truth does not always enhance understanding. An irrelevant truth is78
epistemically inert” (1996, p. 124). I will argue that the goal of an inquiring agent is79
not just to find factually accurate explanations; it is to find explanations that are both80
factually accurate and epistemically valuable. This idea is captured by the following81
three theses:82
1. Whether a piece of information is a potential explanation of the fact that P is83
mostly a non-pragmatic matter.84
4In this paper beliefs should be understood as an agent’s epistemic commitments, in the sense of Levi
(1980). Some authors, such as Cohen (1989), use the term ’acceptance’ for such attitudes, reserving the term
’belief’ for involuntary epistemic states, akin to feelings. There is an extensive literature on the distinction
between acceptance and belief (e.g., Engel, 2000; Cresto, 2009, among many others), but I cannot discuss
the issue in this essay.
5Understanding laws and regularities is, of course, an equivalent or even greater epistemic incentive.
The account presented here is restricted to the explanation of singular facts because the well-known objec-
tions against the explanation of laws require an entirely different analysis, one that most likely will not be
probabilistic.
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2. It is possible to determine the objective epistemic value of a subset of all the85
potential explanations of the fact that P .86
3. In trying to understand the fact that P , an inquiring agent should only accept87
the potential explanations with positive objective epistemic value.88
In the rest of the paper I discuss and defend each of these three theses.89
3 The Objective Basis of Explanation90
In this section and the next I defend the first of the three theses stated above, namely,91
that determining the potential explanations of a given fact is mostly a non-pragmatic92
matter. My basic contention is that an explanation of a singular fact should provide the93
information required to integrate the explanandum into an agent’s cognitive system.94
An explanation should provide some of the factors that contributed to make P a fact,95
and some of the obstacles that could have, but did not prevent it from being one. With-96
out such information, P will describe a brute fact, isolated from the rest of the agent’s97
beliefs about the world. Probability sentences are the connecting tissue of an agent’s98
corpus of beliefs. The influence of the preventing and contributing factors is captured99
by probability sentences of the form p(P |Q) > p(P | ∼ Q) and p(P |Q) < p(P | ∼ Q)100
that indicate that the fact that Q is statistically relevant to the explanandum6.101
The notion of statistical or probabilistic relevance has been used by many au-102
thors in the analysis of explanation. The best-known examples are Hempel’s (1965)103
I-S model, Salmon’s (1971, 1984) S-R model, Railton’s (1978) D-N-P model, and104
Fetzer’s (1974) causal-relevance model. All of these accounts consider precise prob-105
ability values to be an essential part of an explanation. In contrast, I will argue that106
reference to probability values is largely unnecessary. Probability values have descrip-107
tive, predictive, and evidential value, but not explanatory value.108
3.1 Probability Values109
Probability values are thought to be important for two different reasons. If a statistical110
explanation is conceived of as an inductive argument, as it was in Hempel’s original111
Inductive-Statistical model, the degree of expectation that a body of evidence confers112
upon a given event must be very high. Thus the value of the inductive probability113
must be kept in check to make sure it does not fall below a certain threshold as inquiry114
proceeds. On the other hand, if a statistical explanation is understood as an objective115
6Many authors have used probabilities to model the epistemic states of researchers (e.g. Boutilier, 1995;
van Fraassen, 1995; Halpern, 2003; van Benthem, 2003; Arló-Costa & Parikh, 2005). My account uses
probability sentences to model the doxastic basis of an explanation, but an agent’s epistemic states should
not be understood to be probabilistic.
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account of the stochastic process involved, as it is in Salmon’s and Railton’s models,116
it is crucial to avoid the attribution of false probability values to the probabilistic laws.117
In response to criticism by Jeffrey (1971), Hempel (2001) gave up the high prob-118
ability requirement, together with the claim that the explanans of an I-S explanation119
should show that the phenomenon described by the explanandum sentence was to be120
expected. Without this claim, however, the first reason to attribute any importance to121
probability values disappears. If the explanans is not supposed to justify our expecta-122
tions that the explanandum will occur, there is no need to make sure that the value of123
the probability remains over a certain threshold.124
Before we can evaluate the second reason why probability values are deemed to125
be explanatory, we must take a closer look at the logical structure of statistical expla-126
nations. One of the features of probability theory is that it does not have a weakening127
principle. A sound inductive argument that strongly supports its conclusion can be128
transformed into one that strongly undermines its conclusion with the insertion of129
additional true premises. An individual event can be referred to different reference130
classes, and the probability of the property associated with the event can vary consid-131
erably from one class to another. Hence, a body of evidence may confer a high degree132
of expectation upon a given event, while another body of evidence may confer a very133
low degree of expectation upon the same event. This is the problem that Hempel called134
the ambiguity of I-S explanation.135
Hempel’s partial solution to the problem is the requirement of maximal specificity.136
The requirement states that an acceptable statistical explanation should be based “on137
a statistical probability statement pertaining to the narrowest reference class of which,138
according to our total information, the particular occurrence under consideration is a139
member” (1965, p. 398). The requirement does not completely eliminate the ambi-140
guity because the narrowest reference class can only be determined in the light of our141
current knowledge. It does not guarantee that there are no unknown statistical gener-142
alizations that can be used to construct a rival argument. In fact, Hempel claimed that143
“the concept of statistical explanation for particular events is essentially relative to a144
given knowledge situation as represented by a set K of accepted sentences” (p. 402,145
emphasis kept).146
Salmon (1971) showed that the requirement of maximal specificity failed to rule147
out counterexamples in which irrelevant information finds its way into the explana-148
tion. But his main reason to reject Hempel’s solution to the problem was his strong149
conviction that the appropriate reference class for a statistical explanation is one that150
is objectively homogeneous, not one that is epistemically homogeneous.151
The notion of an objective homogenous reference class amounts to this: For any152
given reference classA, and for any given property C, there is, in principle, a partition153
of that class into two subclasses A ∧ C and A∧ ∼ C. A property C is statistically154
relevant to a property B within A if and only if p(B|A ∧ C) 6= p(B|A). Using von155
Mises’s concept of place selection, Salmon defines a homogeneous reference class as156
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follows:157
If every property [C1, C2, C3, . . . , Cn] that determines a place selection158
is statistically irrelevant to B in A, I shall say that A is a homogeneous159
reference class for B. A reference class is homogeneous if there is no160
way, even in principle, to effect a statistically relevant partition without161
already knowing which elements have the attribute in question and which162
do not (1971, p. 43).163
Salmon then replaces Hempel’s requirement of maximal specificity for the refer-164
ence class rule: “Choose the broadest homogeneous reference class to which the sin-165
gle event belongs” (p. 43). This characterization of statistical explanations is supposed166
to avoid any epistemic relativity because any statement of the form p(G|F ) = r that167
meets the homogeneity condition must be regarded as a fundamental statistical law of168
nature. Its reference class cannot be further specified, not because we do not know169
how to make a further relevant partition, but because in principle it is impossible to170
make a further relevant partition.171
Salmon then defines a statistical explanation as follows. If we want to know why a172
member of the class A has the property B, the answer will be a S-R explanation that173
consists of: (i) the prior probability that a member of the classAwill have the property174
B : p(B|A) = r, (ii) a partition into homogeneous cells with respect to the property175
in question: A ∧ C1, A ∧ C2, etc., (iii) the posterior probabilities of the property in176
cells of the partition p(B|A∧C1) = r1, p(B|A∧C2) = r2, etc., and (iv) a statement177
of the location of the individual in question in a particular cell of the partition: “a is a178
member of A ∧ Ck” (pp. 76-77).179
Salmon explicitly requires the use of probability values in providing an explana-180
tion. The use of probability values stems from the fact that the S-Rmodel is at bottom181
a covering-law model. Since any statement of the form p(G|F ) = r that meets the182
homogeneity condition must be regarded as a fundamental statistical law of nature,183
each of the probability sentences in the explanans of a S-R explanation is a law of184
nature. And since the factive condition on explanation demands that every element in185
an explanation must be true, the probability assigned to the explanandum by each of186
these probability sentences must be the right one.187
To see how restrictive this requirement is, consider the following example pro-188
vided by Humphreys:189
If a man dies from lung cancer, having been a heavy smoker, omitting190
from a probabilistic explanation any of the following minor relevant fac-191
tors will result in a false probability claim: cosmic radiation from Alpha192
Centauri, particles from a chimney in Salem, Oregon, and a smoke-filled193
room he entered briefly at the Democratic convention eight years ago. It194
is good to be strict in matters of completeness, but not to the point of195
absurdity (1989, p. 111).196
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Humphreys argues that if one insists in providing the exact probability of the ex-197
planandum as part of the truth conditions of an explanation, it will be impossible to198
distinguish between a complete explanation and a true explanation. The omission of199
absurdly small probabilistically relevant factors, known or unknown, will result in a200
false explanation.201
How can a true but incomplete statistical explanation be provided? Humphreys202
argues that instead of focusing on probability values, we should focus on causal rel-203
evance. An explanation should provide one or more of the factors that are causally204
relevant to an explanandum, and a factor is causally relevant if it changes the propen-205
sity for an outcome. His strategy has the advantage that it makes it possible to offer a206
true explanation of an event by providing a contributing or a counteracting cause even207
in cases where the other factors are not known and the true probability value cannot208
be calculated.209
3.2 Epistemic Relativity210
Although Humphreys’ approach offers an appropriate formal basis for providing a sta-211
tistical explanation, there is an obvious objection. As the many versions of Simpson’s212
Paradox illustrate, one or more of the factors that the agent is unaware of can turn a213
contributing cause into a counteracting cause, or vice versa. Humphreys’ response to214
this objection is puzzling. He says: “Of course, epistemically, we can never know for215
certain that such confounding factors do not exist, but that is an entirely separate mat-216
ter, although regrettably relative frequentists have often failed to separate epistemic217
aspects of probabilistic causality from ontic aspects” (p. 114).218
It seems to me that it is Humphreys who is guilty of not keeping epistemic and219
ontic matters in separate baskets. If Salmon’s model is too demanding, as Humphreys220
maintains, it is because we can never know if we have met all the conditions that it221
imposes on explanation. But Humphreys’ account suffers from a similar problem. In222
order for something to be a contributing or a counteracting cause in Humphreys’ sense,223
there cannot be any further factor, known or unknown, that will invert the influence224
of these causes on the explanandum, or that will neutralize them altogether. Thus225
an agent who offers a causal statistical explanation will always have to relativize the226
explanation to a knowledge situation.227
The accounts offered by Salmon and Humphreys avoid the epistemic relativity of228
statistical explanation by introducing a condition that effectively rules out the possibil-229
ity that a bona fide statistical explanation will be defeated by a rival statistical claim.230
But the cost of avoiding the epistemic relativity of explanation is to render useless their231
accounts of explanation. It is hard to see how such a relativization can be eliminated if232
we want to provide a coherent picture of the role of explanation in inquiry. If we adopt233
the view that epistemic relativity is an unacceptable feature of explanation, we will be234
forced to conclude that there has never been a genuine scientific explanation in the235
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history of science. Furthermore, we lose one of the main incentives for any scientific236
inquiry. Why would anyone want to incur the cost and effort involved in searching237
for explanations if the results cannot be assumed to be true in future decisions and238
deliberations? In Isaac Levi’s words,239
If inquiry cannot be motivated by a concern to remove doubt, what is240
its rationale? If we cannot incorporate the solutions we come close to241
establishing into the evidence and background information for future in-242
vestigations, why should we care that we come close? The truth of the243
well-established conjecture remains an open question and a legitimate is-244
sue for future investigation. Inquiry never settles anything and, hence,245
inquiry–even inquiry into a specific problem–never legitimately termi-246
nates because the matter is settled but only, so it seems, because the in-247
vestigators are tired or bored or have run out of funds. No matter how248
minute a question might be, if inquiry into that question is free of costs,249
it should go on forever (1991, p. 2).250
The reference to a specific epistemic context in the characterization of explanation251
is clearly a departure from tradition. Many philosophers have claimed that pragmatic252
elements have no place in the study of explanation. They recognize that there are in-253
teresting issues associated with the process of providing an explanation in an actual254
context, and their intention is not to belittle their importance. But the concept of ex-255
planation that they characterize is, in Hempel’s words, “a concept which is abstracted,256
as it were, from the pragmatic one, and which does not require relativization with257
respect to questioning individuals any more than does the concept of mathematical258
proof” (1965, p. 426). The same general idea is defended by many other philosophers259
of science.260
Michael Friedman has pointed out that there is a certain equivocation about the261
term ‘pragmatic’. ‘Pragmatic’ can mean roughly the same as ‘psychological’, i.e.,262
having to do with the thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, etc. of individuals. But ’pragmatic’263
can also be synonymous with ’subjective’. In the latter sense, a pragmatic notion must264
always be relativized to a particular individual. Friedman’s claim is that “a concept265
can be pragmatic in the first sense without being pragmatic in the second.” Further on266
he explains: “I don’t see why there can’t be an objective or rational sense of ’scientific267
understanding’, a sense on which what is scientifically comprehensible is constant for268
a relatively large class of people” (1974, p. 8).269
The traditional avoidance of any pragmatic element in a theory of explanation can270
thus be evaluated in two different ways. If one takes ‘pragmatic’ to mean the same as271
‘subjective’, the insistence in providing a non-pragmatic analysis of explanation, i.e.,272
an analysis that does not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the individuals involved, is273
perfectly justified. But if ‘pragmatic’ is interpreted in Friedman’s first sense, there is274
no reason why an analysis of the concept of explanation should not make reference to275
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the epistemic states of the individuals involved in a cognitive project.276
I believe that we should take Friedman’s suggestion seriously and explore the pos-277
sibility of characterizing, in logically precise terms, a notion of explanation that is both278
objective and pragmatic, that does not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the individuals279
involved but that regards their epistemic states, their shared commitments, and their280
cognitive interests and goals as a fundamental part of the analysis. The concept of281
explanation will still be an “abstraction”, in Hempel’s sense, but an abstraction based282
on the decisions that take place when a group of inquiring agents rationally accept283
explanatory information. The resulting concept will be a hybrid, a combination of the284
formal, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions of explanation.285
4 Potential Explanations286
The epistemological framework for the account of explanation that I will present is287
Isaac Levi’s version of the belief-doubt model first proposed by Peirce (1877)7. Ac-288
cording to the belief-doubt model, an inquiring agent presupposes that everything he is289
currently committed to fully believing is true. This does not mean that truth or falsity290
is relative to what the agent believes. But the agent’s judgments of truth are relative291
to what he believes. If the agent is concerned with establishing true explanations of292
phenomena, his decision to accept an explanation can only be made relative to the293
judgments of truth available to him.294
To claim that an inquiring agent presupposes that everything he is currently com-295
mitted to fully believing is true is not to say that he cannot change his mind. Certainty296
or full belief does not entail incorrigibility. Levi explains the claim thus: “To regard297
some proposition as certainly true and as settled is to rule out its falsity as a serious298
possibility for the time being. . . . But from this it does not follow that good reasons will299
not become available in the future for a change of mind and for calling into question300
what is currently considered to be true” (1991, p. 3). Peirce puts it more graphically:301
“The scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload302
of beliefs, the moment experience is against them” (1931, p. 55).303
An inquiring agent has no doubt that all the sentences in his corpus of beliefs are304
true. Nonetheless, he does not regard all of the facts stated by these sentences as being305
equally well understood. The degree to which an agent understands the fact expressed306
by a sentence P will depend on how well integrated P is to the agent’s cognitive sys-307
tem. It will not depend on how much support it has or on how epistemically entrenched308
7Although my account of explanation uses Levi’s belief revision theory as theoretical framework, it must
be pointed out that Levi does not agree with my approach (personal communication). The main reason is
that Levi believes that all explanations with probabilistic premises presuppose a D-N explanation stated in
dispositional terms. Furthermore, Levi associates statistical explanations with the elimination of surprise
and an increase in the expectation of the occurrence of the explanandum (Levi, 1988, 1995). The account
of explanation that I present here does not entail those two consequences.
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it is. On the one hand, if a sentence has been accepted in his corpus of beliefs, it is309
judged to be true and no further argument is necessary. On the other hand, poorly un-310
derstood phenomena can be highly epistemically entrenched, and completely useless311
facts can be very well understood.312
According to the belief-doubt model, an inquiring agent’s judgments of truth are313
always relative to what he is currently committed to fully believing. Thus, an agent’s314
decision to accept an explanation can only be made relative to the judgments of truth315
available to him. Naturally such decisions will lack any sort of objectivity. An agent316
who wants to claim objectivity for the explanations that he accepts must first make sure317
that the explanation is consistent with K, the set of beliefs that represents the shared318
agreement between the members of a community of experts. More technically, the319
states of belief of the individual experts can be partially ordered in a manner satisfying320
the requirements of a Boolean algebra. In consequence, it will be possible to form the321
meet of their individual states, i.e., the strongest common consequence of all their322
states of belief (Levi, 1991, p. 13).323
Let P be a sentence in K. A set of sentences E is a potential explanation of the324
fact stated by P relative to K just in case the following conditions are fulfilled:325
(i) K ∪ E is consistent.326
(ii) E 6⊂ K.327
(iii) There is a sentence Q such that Q ∈ E.328
(iv) Either p(P |Q) > p(P | ∼ Q) ∈ E or p(P |Q) < p(P | ∼ Q) ∈ E.329
(v) There is no R ∈ K such that p(P |Q&R) = p(P | ∼ Q&R).330
(vi) P and Q are logically independent.331
(vii) Nothing else is an element of E.332
The first condition states that a potential explanation must be consistent with the333
corpus of beliefs in which the explanandum is accepted. The second condition states334
that the potential explanation cannot be already accepted in K. The third condition335
says that the potential explanation must include a singular sentence Q that describes336
a potentially relevant factor. The fourth condition states that Q is positively or nega-337
tively relevant to the fact that P . The fifth condition guarantees that P and Q will not338
be spuriously correlated, as far as we know. Condition (vi) guarantees that P will not339
explain itself. It also prevents the inclusion of trivial cases in which p(P |Q) = 1 be-340
cause P ` Q. A potential explanation is thus a set containing a singular sentence that341
describes a fact, and a probability sentence that states the potential statistical relevance342
of that fact to the explanandum.343
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Using this definition of a potential explanation, we can now characterize the no-344
tion of an explanation space. An explanation space can be understood as the set of345
sentences that contains all the potential explanations of P , regardless of whether the346
inquirers are aware of them or not.347
(EP ) For every sentence P in K, there is a set {E1, E2, . . . , Ek} such that Ei is an348
element of the set iff it is a potential explanation of P . The set, denoted EP , is349
the explanation space of P .350
The explanation space will contain logically equivalent and empirically equivalent351
potential explanations. On the one hand, if E1 = {Q, p(P |Q) > p(P | ∼ Q)} and352
E2 = {R, p(P |R) > p(P |R˜)}, where Q and R are logically equivalent, then E1353
and E2 are logically equivalent potential explanations. If an agent accepts E1, she is354
thereby committed to E2. On the other hand, if Q and R contain coextensive singu-355
lar terms or predicates that occupy the same places in Q and R, E1 and E2 will be356
empirically equivalent potential explanations. However, the explanatory value and the357
credibility of E1 and E2 will not be assessed in the same way unless the agents who358
assess them are aware that the singular terms or predicates are coextensive8.359
5 The Epistemic Value of Explanation360
Consistency with K, the set of beliefs that represents the shared agreement between361
the members of a learning community, is not enough to guarantee the objectivity of an362
explanation. The objectivity of our conjectures lies, as Popper correctly points out, “in363
the fact that they can be intersubjectively tested” (1959, p. 44). The intersubjective test364
that an explanation must pass is the evaluation of its credibility and of its explanatory365
value in the eyes of the experts.366
Suppose a group of inquirers–a community of experts in the field–wants to con-367
sider the adoption of an explanation. To do so, they must first adopt a belief state368
K representing the shared agreement between them. Such a belief state will be the369
strongest common consequence of all their states of belief. Obviously, such a state370
will contain more than just singular sentences representing facts and probability sen-371
tences. It will also include sentences that state which are the most relevant problems372
in the field, what type of experiments and observations are considered more reliable,373
in addition to basic methodological and reasoning principles.374
Once the members of the community of experts have accepted a common corpus375
K, they must take it as the basis for establishing a set of potential explanations of the376
problem at hand, For example, suppose a group of inquirers are trying to establish377
why P . They must initially agree on a set of ground facts and low-level hypotheses.378
8Condition (iv) also introduces an element of epistemic relativity because the non-existence of a screen-
ing off factor can only be guaranteed relative toK.
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Statistical data and the chronology of the explanandum will be easy to agree upon.379
The explanation of some aspects of the phenomenon can be non-controversially ac-380
cepted, while the explanation of others will be a matter of heated debate. After the381
inquirers have agreed on a common corpus of beliefs K, they can put together a set382
of explanatory options, denoted OP , which will include all the factors consistent with383
K that might explain P and that have been identified by the inquirers. At this stage384
of inquiry it does not matter whether the potential explanations are uncontroversial or385
completely outlandish, as long as they are somehow relevant to the problem at hand386
and consistent with K, that is, if they fulfill the requirements to be in EP .387
It is possible for a group of agents to share the same information and yet disagree388
about the degree of belief or credal probability that they assign to the information in389
the set of explanatory options. Since the agents do not want to beg the question by390
assigning the highest marks to their favorite explanations, they must adopt a com-391
mon credal probability measure. A common strategy to eliminate the conflict be-392
tween different credal probability distributions is to represent the shared agreement as393
the weighted average of the distributions in conflict. The resulting credal probability394
function C determines the objective risk of error incurred in accepting a potential ex-395
planation in OP . Let Ei be the conjunction of the elements of a potential explanation396
Ei in OP , i.e., the conjunction of a singular sentence and a probability sentence. For397
every potential explanation Ei, the risk of error is 1− C(Ei).398
On the other hand, different inquirers will disagree in their assessment of the im-399
portance of the explanations contained in the set of explanatory options. Despite these400
differences, there must be a minimal objective criterion to measure the explanatory401
value of any potential explanation. That criterion is the new information carried by402
the potential explanation, which, following Levi, I identify with its logical strength.403
The set of potential expansions of a belief setK can be partially ordered by a classical404
consequence relation. The set is a Boolean algebra in which the minimum is K and405
the maximum is the inconsistent state. If a probability function M is defined over406
this set, and if the only element that has probability zero is the inconsistent state, po-407
tential expansions of K will strictly increase in probability with a decrease in logical408
strength. When the M -function is defined over the set of potential explanations of409
interest to the inquirer, we obtain a measure of the informational content of the po-410
tential explanations in OP . The measure of the informational content of a potential411
explanation Ei, denoted Cont(Ei), is 1−M(Ei).412
The informational content of a potential explanation is the first objective criterion413
that should be used in assessing the explanatory value of the elements of OP . The414
evaluation of their explanatory value is subject to the following weak monotonicity415
requirement (WMR):416
(WMR) If a potential explanation E1 in OP carries at least as much in-417
formation as another potential explanation E2 in OP , E1 carries at least418
as much explanatory value as E2.419
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Not all potential explanations of the fact that P are comparable in terms of logical420
content. Since the community of experts wants to consider all the explanations avail-421
able to them, they might invoke further criteria in order to complete the quasi-ordering422
imposed by the weak monotonicity requirement. In order to assess the explanatory423
value of the remaining elements of OP , they can evaluate if they have certain proper-424
ties that are considered explanatorily virtuous.425
There are several explanatory virtues mentioned in the philosophical literature.426
Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989), for example, argue that explanations improve427
our understanding through the unification of our knowledge. Explanations that reduce428
the number of independent assumptions we have to make about the world are to be429
preferred to those that do not. This suggests that the potential explanations in OP430
could be ordered according to some set of rules that determines their unifying power.431
The problem is that neither Friedman nor Kitcher have provided an account that432
can be applied to explanations generally. Friedman’s original argument was intended433
as an account of the explanation of scientific laws. Friedman argued, for example,434
that the kinetic theory of gases is explanatory because it unified different laws and435
properties of gases that were previously disconnected. Friedman’s only attempt to436
formalize and generalize the idea of explanation as unification was incisively criticized437
by Kitcher (1976) and Salmon (1989).438
But Kitcher’s account is no more helpful that Friedman’s. According to Kitcher,439
the explanatory worth of candidates cannot be assessed individually. In his view, a440
successful explanation earns that name because it belongs to the explanatory store, a441
set that contains those derivations that collectively provide the best systematization of442
our beliefs. ‘Science supplies us with explanations whose worth cannot be appreciated443
by considering them one-by-one but only by seeing how they form part of a systematic444
picture of the order of nature” (1989, p. 430). The idea that a virtuous explanation445
should have the potential to unify our beliefs is uncontroversial, but no one, to my446
knowledge, has provided a general account of explanation as unification that is not447
restricted to the case of scientific laws or scientific explanatory exemplars.448
Mellor (1995) provides an account of explanatory value that is better suited for449
our purposes.450
Mellor approaches explanation via his theory of causation. The theory requires451
every cause to raise the chances of its effects. That is, a fact C causes a fact E iff452
chC(E) > ch∼C(E). When causes are used in the explanation of a given fact, Mel-453
lor argues that the explanans must necessitate its explanandum, or at least raise its454
probability as much as possible, thereby reducing its chance of not existing. Thus, he455
concludes, “the more C raises E’s chance the better it explains it” (p. 77). If we were456
to accept Mellor’s idea, it would be possible to order the potential explanations in OP457
according to the difference between chC(E) and ch∼C(E).458
The main problem with Mellor’s proposal is that when we examine a genuinely459
stochastic process, the value of the chance that the cause confers on the explanandum460
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will be irrelevant. As Jeffrey has convincingly argued, the information required to461
explain E is the same information used to explain ∼E, regardless of the value of462
the chance. Furthermore, if E is sometimes randomly caused by C and sometimes463
randomly caused by C∗, and chC(E) > chC∗(E), there is no reason to think that C464
is a better explanation than C∗.465
Mellor will respond to the objection by claiming that chances measure possibili-466
ties. “The less possible ∼E is, i.e. the less ch(∼E) is and hence the greatest ch(E)467
is, the closer the fact E is to being necessary. This is the sense in which a cause C468
may explain E better or worse, depending on how close it comes to making E nec-469
essary, i.e. on how much it raises ch(E)” (p. 77). Independently of whether we can470
make sense of such concepts as almost necessary or nearly impossible, it is not clear471
how such notions would enhance our notion of explanation. Probabilities are impor-472
tant in statistical contexts because knowing that C raises the chance of E allows us473
to know what makes E possible, and because the chance that C gives E allows us to474
adjust our expectations ofE’s occurrence. But it seems to me that mixing chances and475
possibilities adds nothing to our understanding of why E is a fact.9476
A third candidate for judging the epistemic value of an explanation is Whewell’s477
(1837) notion of consilience. Consilience is intended to serve as a measure of how478
much a theory explains, and it can therefore be used to compare the explanatory value479
of two different hypotheses. One hypothesis has more explanatory value than another480
if the former explains more of the evidence than the latter. Thagard (1978) provides481
compelling evidence that this idea is often used by scientists in support of their theo-482
ries. For example, Fresnel defended the wave theory of light by saying that it explained483
the facts of reflection and refraction at least as well as did the particle theory, and that484
there were other facts involving diffraction and polarization that only the wave theory485
could explain. Translated into my account, this means that if Ei raises the probability486
of more facts connected to the explanandum than Ej , then Ei is a better explanation487
than Ej .488
The problem with consilience is that, once again, the account works well in the489
explanation of laws, but it will not work in the explanation of singular facts. Whether490
a given fact explains more aspects connected to the explanandum than another fact is491
hard to say. We would have to define what a fact “connected to the explanandum”492
is, and it is doubtful that a non-pragmatic formalization of this notion can be found.493
Besides, sometimes a theory can explain too much. Lavoisier accused the phlogiston494
theory of this particular crime.495
Are there any other criteria that will allow us to assess the explanatory value of the496
potential explanations in OP ? We still have not examined the values that are usually497
mentioned in the context of theory choice: simplicity, accuracy, fruitfulness, and so498
9In Páez (2013) I offer an exhaustive analysis of the relation between causation and explanation in
Mellor’s work.
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on10. But such an analysis is unnecessary. If the criteria are such that the community of499
experts can agree on their importance and on how they should be applied in particular500
cases, they can be added to the belief state K that represents their shared agreement.501
The agents will then be able to complete, to some degree, the quasi-ordering gener-502
ated by the monotonicity condition with respect to the M -function. But to expect a503
complete agreement in the way that all the agents engaged in common inquiry assess504
the explanatory value of different potential explanation is to expect a heterogeneous505
group of inquirers to agree on what aspects of reality they find interesting or useful.506
If a common decision is required nonetheless, the community of experts can adopt507
the following compromise. The agents must first identify the elements of the set OP508
that can be completely ordered because they are comparable in terms of strength or509
because they can be compared using the criteria to evaluate explanatory value that they510
have incorporated to K. The agents can then agree to disagree about the explanatory511
value of the remaining elements of OP . Let O∗P be a set of explanatory options such512
that O∗P ⊆ OP and such that the M-value of each element of the set is determined.513
Combining the credal probability function C with the M -function defined over the514
elements of O∗P we obtain a value that the community of experts can use to select the515
best explanation of P . I will call this result the objective epistemic value of a potential516
explanation11:517
(OEV) V (Ei) = αC(Ei) + (1− α)Cont(Ei)518
The agents’ interest in valuable information should not outweigh the desideratum to519
avoid error; thus α ≥ 0.5. And since the information they seek should not be worth-520
less, 1 > α.521
Now, some researchers will be bolder than others in privileging content over cred-522
ibility, while others will be more cautious and adopt the opposite attitude. Let q be a523
common boldness index, which is the average of their individual boldness indices. If524
q = (1− α)/α , we obtain the following affine transformation of OEV:525
(OEV) V (Ei) = C(Ei)− qM(Ei)526
The experts should reject a potential explanation in O∗P if OEV is negative, remain527
uncommitted if it is 0, and accept it if it is positive. Any potential explanation in O∗P528
with positive objective epistemic value is an objective explanation of P in K. The529
disjunction of all such objective explanations is the objective explanation of P in K:530
(OEP ) The objective explanation of P in K, denoted OEP , is the disjunction of all the531
potential explanations in O∗P with positive objective epistemic value.532
One of the consequences of taking the functions C and M –which represent the533
average credibility and the agreed upon explanatory value, respectively– as a basis534
10There is a vast literature on the epistemic and social values used in science. The compilations by
Machamer and Wolters (2004) and Kinkaid, Dupré and Wylie (2007) offer a contemporary perspective on
the topic.
11This strategy is similar to the one followed by Levi (1991) to characterize the maximization of the
expected epistemic utility obtained by expanding a corpus of beliefs.
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for the analysis of the potential explanations in O∗P is that each individual agent was535
forced to sacrifice his personal evaluation of credibility and value in order to accept536
the verdict of the community of experts. Suppose an agent has accepted a potential537
explanation of P based on his individual assessment of its credibility and explanatory538
value. Now suppose that he submits his “subjective” explanation to the community539
of experts, and the explanation is judged to be maximally credible and maximally540
valuable by the community, thus becoming an objective explanation. Does the agent541
understand more now that his explanation has been certified by others? It seems to542
me that he does not. But if the agent does not obtain more understanding from this543
recognition, why should anyone seek objectivity for an explanation that he or she544
already believes?545
Part of the answer is that the belief-doubt model is not a recipe for dogmatism. A546
seldom-noted fact about inquiry is that most newly suggested explanatory hypotheses547
do not survive the test of intersubjective scrutiny. If the agent is aware of this fact–548
and he should be if he is a responsible inquirer-it would be imprudent for him to549
give his full assent to an explanatory hypothesis that contradicts firmly established550
theories and findings without obtaining at least a partial intersubjective assessment551
of its merit. An agent does not need to fully believe that an explanation is true to552
obtain the understanding that the explanation provides. Any inquirer can explore the553
consequences of a hypothesis by assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is true. If554
the hypothesis is judged to have positive objective epistemic value by a community of555
experts, the inquirer will then be fully justified in giving it his full assent.556
But the question remains. If the agent does not obtain new understanding in the557
approval that he receives from his peers, why should he seek their approval? What558
prevents an agent from individually assessing the credibility and explanatory value of559
a potential explanation, and deciding to fully believe it if his individual understanding560
is thereby increased? In other words, why should objectivity matter? The answer561
is that objectivity itself is a property of information that some agents find valuable562
and some do not. An agent who decides to be a member of a learning community563
does so because he is convinced that his beliefs will be more valuable if they are564
objective. Other agents will find that objectivity adds no value to their corpus of565
beliefs. Just as there is a difference between objective and subjective explanation,566
there is an analogous distinction between objective and subjective understanding. The567
latter is the type of understanding that Hempel (1965) correctly believed should be568
shunned at all costs from an account of scientific explanation. But the reason it should569
be shunned is not that it is an inferior type of understanding. The reason is that the570
members of a scientific community are among the many agents who find objectivity571
valuable. Therefore, an account of scientific explanation should avoid any reference572
to an evaluative process in which the agent shows no concern for the views of others.573
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6 Conclusion574
The belief-doubt model provides an adequate basis for an account of explanation that575
takes into consideration the epistemic value of the information that we acquire through576
inquiry. By including the shared commitments and the cognitive interests and goals577
of the individuals engaged in a cognitive enterprise, we obtain a notion of explanation578
that is objective by any reasonable standard of objectivity, and that clarifies the con-579
nection between explanation and understanding. The main reason why I have adopted580
the belief-doubt model is that an account of explanation that takes into considera-581
tion the epistemic value of the information that we acquire through inquiry leads to a582
natural resolution of the conflict between the purely pragmatic approach to explana-583
tion defended by Achinstein and van Fraassen, for example, and the more common584
approach in which pragmatic considerations are not assigned any serious role.585
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